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Chinese scholarship on China-India relations focuses on 
ways to preserve China’s national interest and to strengthen 
mutual trust between the two countries. It mostly centres 
on the border disputes between the two countries and on 
the growing defence cooperation between India and the 
United States.6
Li Li writes that a “gradual maturing process” (走向成熟的过
程, zou xiang chengshu de guocheng) has been taking place 
in China-India relations since 1988.7 As proof, she points 
to the fact that the two countries have managed to avoid 
open conflict over their territorial disputes for decades. 
Moreover, the two sides have repeatedly tried to find a 
peaceful solution to the disputes. In a press release after 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988,  
the Indian leader announced that both India and China 
were focused on finding a solution to the border disputes. 
This visit was the beginning of a new phase of normalisation 
in China-India relations, and considerable progress has 
been made since then. A working group on the demarcation 
3 Li Li is an associate research fellow at the Institute of South Asian and 
Southeast Asian Studies at CICIR. Her research is focused on India and 
South Asia.
4 Wu Yongnian is a researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International 
Studies.
5 Shi Hongyuan is an associate professor at Guizhou University of 
Finance and Economics.
6 The territorial dispute between China and India dates back to the 
1950s. It intensified during the brief Sino-Indian war of 1962. China 
claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing considers 
to be part of Tibet, contending that it was illegally given by Tibet to the 
UK in 1914, when it fell on the Indian side of the McMahon line drawn 
up under the Simla Accord between China, the UK, and Tibet. Another 
area of contention is the desert Himalayan plateaux of Aksai Chin. The 
region is strategically important for Beijing, because it connects Tibet 
to Xinjiang. India considers Aksai Chin to be an extension of Ladakh, 
attached to Jammu and Kashmir. In 1963, China also gained back the 
Shaksgam valley to the north of Kashmir, which was ceded to China by 
Pakistan. India disputes China’s claim to Shaksgam.  
7 Li identifies three phases in China-India relations: the period of 
friendship until 1962, the “cold period” (冰凉期, bingliang qi) between 
1962 and 1988, and the period of improving China-India relations since 
the visit of the Prime Minister of India to China in 1988 and the beginning 
of a process of normalisation.
of borders was set up at the same time as the Indian leader’s 
visit. Subsequently, two major agreements were signed, in 
1993 and 1996. The 1993 agreement, Li says, confirmed that 
both sides would commit to keeping the peace in the areas 
near the “Line of Actual Control” at the borders.8 The 1996 
agreement banned all military activities near the border. In 
2003, the two countries also implemented a “mechanism 
for meetings between Special Representatives” (特别代表
会晤机制, tebie daibiao huiwu jizhi) on border issues. This 
mechanism resulted in the 2005 Political Parameters and 
Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China 
Boundary Question Agreement. Li says that the 2005 
agreement was a genuine “breakthrough” (突 破，tupo). In 
2006, it was followed by a Joint Declaration by the Republic 
of India and the People’s Republic of China.9
Li says that the two countries’ efforts to settle the border 
issue peacefully are unprecedented and should be “obvious 
to all” (有目共睹, you youmugongdu). She says that the 
failure to arrive at a definitive solution is mainly down to 
the lack of trust and mutual understanding between the two 
countries. She believes that this failure of understanding is 
exacerbated by the malicious assertions made by Western 
researchers and part of the Indian media. Li accuses these 
writers of working to create a “confrontational point of 
view” (对抗视角，duikang shijiao). They always present 
relations between China and India as antagonistic and they 
“over-apply the concept of ‘war between the dragon and the 
elephant’ in interpreting China-India relations” (“龙象之争”
成为他们解读中印关系的惯用标签, “longxiang zhi zheng” 
chengwei tamen jidu zhong yin guanxi de guanyong 
biaoqian). To confront the media hype around the China-
India conflict, the political leaders of the two countries have 
increased the number of high-level meetings and have set up 
a formal exchange mechanism. They have also encouraged 
the development of bilateral relations in some areas.
Wu Yongnian also thinks the increased number of high-
level meetings is significant. He sees Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh’s October 2013 visit to Beijing as 
particularly important. During this visit, Singh announced 
new economic and financial measures to encourage Chinese 
investment in India. Wu says that by doing so, the prime 
minister hopes to strengthen cooperation with China and to 
leverage “Chinese dynamism” (中国动力，zhongguo dongli) 
to help India’s economy out of its current difficulties. The 
two governments also announced that visa restrictions for 
Chinese citizens going to India would be loosened. Wu says 
that the measure is intended not only to promote tourism, 
but also to increase mutual trust between the two countries.
8 The “Line of Actual Control” essentially corresponds to the McMahon 
Line drawn up in 1914. In the agreement, both parties committed to 
respecting the “Line of Actual Control” without actually stating that it was 
an explicit recognition of the earlier demarcation of their common borders.
9 In October 2013, another China-India agreement on border defence 
cooperation was signed during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s 
visit to Beijing; see “China-India border defense deal ‘a highlight’: FM”, 
Xinhua, 24 October 2013, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2013-10/24/c_132827780.htm. Li’s article was published before 
this agreement was made. 
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Li says that decoupling the sensitive issue of borders from 
potential cooperation in other areas is aimed at promoting 
trade and mutual confidence. She says the two countries have 
invested a great deal in communication and have worked 
to promote bilateral trade and cooperation in the financial 
sector,  in energy resources, and in technology transfer. 10 
They have also stepped up person-to-person exchanges in 
academia and in tourism. Whether to achieve “short-term 
expedient harmony” (权宜下的短暂和睦, quanyi xia de 
duanzan hemu) or because of a “long-term political strategy” 
(运筹中的长远有治, yunchou zhong de changyuan youzhi), 
Li says that the two countries are gradually implementing 
a new kind of great power partnership. India and China 
do not consider themselves “adversaries” (对手, duishou) 
or “competitors” (竞争者, jingzhengzhe). Instead, they see 
themselves as true partners, cooperating for the benefit of 
both sides.
The two countries have also established a degree of military 
and security cooperation. Li says Chinese Defence Minister 
Cao Gangchan visited India in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, 
Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee came to China. 
Mukherjee’s visit culminated in the two countries signing 
a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation. 
In 2007, China and India instituted a system of dialogue 
between their defence ministries. The two countries even 
carried out joint military manoeuvres in 2003, 2007, and 
2008. Military dialogue was suspended in 2010 because 
of a dispute over visas, but talks resumed in late 2011. In 
September 2012, Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie 
travelled to India. After that, the two countries revived 
and strengthened military cooperation. Li says that this 
cooperation is a sign of the maturity of China-India relations.
Li admits that, although progress has been made, trust 
between China and India in the military sphere remains low. 
Because of the difficulties of resolving the border disputes, 
both China and India are “unwilling to risk relaxing military 
preparedness” (不敢放松军事准备, bugan fangsong junshi 
zhunbei). And as the two countries’ economies have 
strengthened, they have new reasons to focus on achieving 
their own interests. In the long term, this may make 
competition inevitable. 
Shi Hongyuan also talks about the tension between Indian 
and Chinese interests. He thinks India’s relationship with 
China cannot simply be evaluated in terms of bilateral 
relations. A true understanding of the relationship must 
also take account of the role of the US. Like Li, Shi believes 
that India aims to become a major power, to play an 
important role on the world stage, and to create an external 
environment favourable to achieving its aspirations. 
However, unlike Li, he thinks India aims to achieve this 
objective not by relying on China’s economic power, but 
by using US military might. India could work to contain 
10 The two countries have held six financial dialogues on the global 
financial crisis since 2006. In 2006, India and China signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on oil and gas cooperation and in 2010, they signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on green technology cooperation.
China’s expansion in the region by reinforcing its military 
alliance with Washington.
Shi warns against further strengthening of India-US security 
cooperation. He says that China must “take precautions” 
(未雨绸缪, weiyuchoumou) to ensure cooperation does not 
harm China’s security or national interests. Shi says that 
India’s political leaders believe China will soon represent 
a real threat to India. India’s armed forces have publicly 
warned the government more than once about the growing 
gap between Indian and Chinese military capabilities. A 
former head of the Indian air force has even said that China 
represents a worse threat than Pakistan.11 Indian leaders, 
according to Shi, hope that India will in the medium term 
build military strength equivalent to that of China. He says 
that they believe India must seize this unique and historic 
opportunity to overturn Asian power structures and 
create new relations between Asian countries. The Indian 
government is trying to confront China’s gradual emergence 
by strengthening 
India’s national 
power. It wants 
to retain the 
capacity to 
compete militarily 
with China and, 
if necessary, to 
increase its ability to “act as a deterrent to China” (对中国
构成一定威慑, dui zhonguo goucheng yiding weishe). The 
key to this strategy is stronger relations with Washington. 
Military and security cooperation with the US will enable 
India to consolidate its military capacity by acquiring 
American weapons, diversifying import sources, and 
gaining access to advanced American technology. Both New 
Delhi and Washington agree that India must strengthen its 
hard power if it is to counterbalance China’s moves in the 
region and prepare for any potential direct confrontation.
Shi says that security cooperation between India and the US 
in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean is aimed 
at “containing” (牵制, qianzhi) China. India-US cooperation 
has already increased tensions over navigation routes in the 
Indian Ocean and has created “security challenges” (安全挑
战, anquan tiaozhan). India’s maritime capacity has grown, 
which means its activities in the South China Sea and the 
western Pacific could extend further and take place more 
often. This could trigger conflict between China and India. 
On land, India-US security cooperation has already caused 
friction on China’s western borders. In the future, India will 
be able to use advanced technological weapons acquired 
from the US to extend its reach right up to China’s border 
territories, and “rely on US strength to pressure China” 
(借助美国的力量向中国施压, jiezhu meiguo de liliang xiang 
zhongguo shiya). This would give India significant leverage 
in any negotiations with Beijing, and could enable it to force 
11 Shi cites Harsh V. Pant, “China and India: a rivalry takes shape”, 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 2011, available at http://www.fpri.
org/enotes/201106.pant.china_india.pdf. Neither Shi nor Pant names the 
official in question.
Because of the difficulties of 
resolving the border disputes, 
both China and India are 
“unwilling to risk relaxing 
military preparedness”.
7China to compromise on borders. Shi says that given the 
increased competition between Washington and Beijing, 
India’s attitude towards the two powers will be decisive 
in defining the geopolitics of Eurasia in the twenty-first 
century.
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Russian influence in Mongolia began to decline after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, China has 
become the most important player in Mongolia’s economic 
development. China is Mongolia’s leading trading partner 
and the main focus of its diplomacy. However, the 
relationship is asymmetric: Mongolia is not a priority for 
China, as evidenced by the limited academic literature 
written on the subject in China.19 Instead, Mongolia 
12 Wei Lisu is a professor in the Department of International Politics, 
Central China Normal University in Wuhan, Hubei province. He 
specialises in Mongolia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Xia Anling 
is a professor of Marxism at the Huazhong Normal University, Hubei.
13 Wu Yun is a PhD student at Inner Mongolia University.
14 Zhang Haixia is a graduate of Heilongjiang University, Harbin, who 
specialises in relations between China and the former Soviet bloc. 
15 Wang Cong is a researcher on Central Asia at the China Institutes of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).
16 Wang Zhaobin is a senior reporter for the Chinese review, Energy 
(“能源” 杂志), specialising in coal and renewable energies.
17 Yan Xiaodong is an honorary research fellow at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS).
18 Ta Kung Pao is China’s oldest newspaper, founded in 1902. It is based 
in Hong Kong and financed by the Chinese Communist Party, and it is 
generally considered to be a mouthpiece for the country’s leadership. 
19 The article by Wei Lisu and Xia Anling points out that between 1992 
and 2013, the CICR published only 11 articles on Mongolia, with the 
leading Chinese academic journal, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi – World 
Economics and Politics, publishing only two. The research centre most 
active in dealing with the subject is the Institute of Northeast Asian 
Studies, Jilin University. 
